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Collection agencies, debt collectors and the attorneys representing them,
have become a part of every day commerce in the United States. Tradition-
ally, they provide an important service to corporate America. Many collectors
and attorneys are ethical and take great strides to comply with the law. Sadly,
however, many collectors and their attorneys intentionally violate the
consumer protection laws or unknowingly violate the law because they are
unwilling to take the time to educate themselves. Because of these unethical
and illegal actions, Congress and several states have greatly expanded the
applicability of consumer protection laws, and thereby, the liability for
violating them. Many states now have unfair or deceptive practices acts, laws
concerning debt adjustment, and laws regulating collection agencies. Areas
in which many collection agencies and attorneys may be in violation of the
law include the unauthorized practice of law, and laws concerning champerty
and maintenance. In most states, violation of these laws can result in the
imposition of damages, treble damages, attorney's fees, costs, injunctive
relief, and, in certain cases, criminal penalties including incarceration and
fines.
* Stephen J. Maggio received his J.D. from the Cumberland School of Law in 1988
where he served as articles editor of the American Journal of Trial Advocacy from 1987 to
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II. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT-GENERAL PROVISIONS
In 1977, the Congress of the United States enacted the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act [ FDCPA ].' In enacting this legislation, Congress
specifically noted that the existing laws were inadequate to protect
consumers. 2 The FDCPA was intended to promote consistent laws to protect
consumers.3 The overall thrust of the law was to prevent misleading, abusive,
and deceptive practices in collecting debts.' Since its enactment over twenty
years ago, the law has remained essentially unchanged; however, for our
purposes, there have been two important amendments to the FDCPA. First,
in 1986 Congress removed the exemptions for attorneys.' Second, in 1996
Congress exempted formal legal pleadings from the requirement of having to
include the "Mini-Miranda" warning.6
1I. THE FDCPA REGULATES "DEBT COLLECTORS"
"Debt collector" is a term of art under the FDCPA, defined by 15 U.S.C.
§ I 692a(6). In Tolentino v. Friedman,7 the court held:
[The] FDCPA ... § 1692a(6) regulates the activities of a debt collector,
which is defined as: "Any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is
the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another."8
The definition of "debt collector" includes two major groups of people:
(1) those whose principal business is the collection of debts; and, (2) those
who, while not principally engaged in the collection of debts, nonetheless
regularly collect or attempt to collect debts owed to another.9 This second part
of the definition is particularly applicable to attorneys. Although broad, this
definition is not without limits and it is important to read the definition
1. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b-1692e.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (Supp. 1996).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 I) (Supp. 1996).
7. 46 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995).
8. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Heintz. 25 F.3d 536(7th Cir. 1994)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
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completely. It does not include collection of a debt which is not in default at
the time it is turned over to the collector. °
In many instances, creditors are exempt from the application of the
FDCPA because they are attempting to collect a debt owed to themselves."
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A) exempts "any officer or employee of a creditor
while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor."''
However, this exemption is not absolute. The FDCPA has been held to apply
to a creditor using a name other than its own to suggest the involvement of a
third-party collector. 3 A trend is developing in certain cases, where the focus
is the relationship between the creditor and collector. If it is determined that
the collector is the agent of the creditor as opposed to an independent
contractor, then liability may attach to the creditor. These cases have relied
on the general principals of agency law.'4
Prior to 1986, attorneys were specifically exempted from the definition
of debt collector set forth under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 5 As mentioned above,
Congress deleted this exemption in 1986, thus subjecting attorneys who
otherwise would meet the criteria for being a debt collector to the require-
ments of the FDCPA. 6 Other courts both before and since Heintz have
followed this same rationale."' In determing the amount of collection activity
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(7).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(Supp. 1996).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A).
13. See Denker v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., No. 94-C- 1817, 1996 WL 724784.
at *I (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27. 1996) (discussing whether an issue of fact existed as to whether the
utility company-creditor was liable); Fratto v. Citibank, N.A., No. C-96-2946 MHP, 1996 WL
554549. at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1996) (issue of fact as to whether Citibank liable under
FDCPA). Other courts have held that a creditor may not escape liability under the FDCPA if
it is using a corporate subsidiary as a collection agency. See Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc..
15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1994); Phillips v. Periodical Publishers' Serv. Bureau, Inc., 369 S.E.2d
154 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 388 S.E.2d 787 (S.C. 1989). Cf Meads v. Citicorp Credit
Servs., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 330, 334 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that no violation occurred where
a subsidiary only collected for the parent and where it disclosed its subsidiary relationship on
its letterhead).
14. See, e.g., Howe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that a magazine retailer would not be liable absent proof of agency relationship):
Jacksonville State Bank v. Barnwell, 481 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1985) (finding facts sufficient for
jury to find repossessor to be agent of bank): Rochester-Hall Drug Co. v. Bowden, 118 So. 674
(Ala. 1928) (inferring that creditor participated in false imprisonment of the debtor).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (Supp. 1977).
16. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998).
17. See Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that attorney who, during
a nine month period, attempted to collect debts from 639 different individuals was "regularly"
attempting to collect debts); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that
attorney who "regularly" collected debts for others to be debt collector-attorney had filed 22
foreclosure actions within an eighteen month period); Sluys v. Hand, 831 F. Supp. 321, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding FDCPA applies to attorney "reg." collecting debt).
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necessary to trigger a claim, the court in Cacace v. Lucas"8 held that "regu-
larly" means steady, or uniform in course, practice or occurence.' 9 It matters
not that the activity is legal in nature.20 However, it should be remembered
that the 1996 amendments to the FDCPA specifically exempted legal
pleadings from the requirement that collection notices contain the "Mini-
Miranda" warning telling consumers that they are attempting to collect a debt
and that any information sent in response would be used to collect the debt.2
IV. THE FDCPA COVERS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF TRANSACTIONS
"The term 'debt' means any obligation... arising out of a transaction in
which the. . . services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily
for personal, family or household purposes ....22 In general, the initial
question to be asked when evaluating a claim of whether the dispute is a
"debt" for the purposes of the FDCPA is whether the transaction was for
personal or household purposes. Commercial debts and transactions are not
covered by the FDCPA. Courts considering this question have typically given
a broad reading to the term. Many everyday occurrences fall under the
coverage of the FDCPA. The following are examples of transactions covered
by the FDCPA: medical bills; 23 rent; 24 utility bills;25 bills for forced place
insurance premiums;26 and student loans. 27 When assessing loan transactions,
however, caution needs to be used as the loan is not in default in many
instances when the collection activity occurs and the collector would,
therefore, not be included in the definition of a "debt collector" under the
18. 775 F. Supp. 502, 504-05 (D. Conn. 1990).
19. See id.
20. See Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
attorneys engaged in litigation were "debt collectors" subject to FDCPA); Shapiro & Meintliold
v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1992) (holding that the FDCPA applies to attorneys even
where activity is purely legal).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)(Supp. 1996).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
23. See Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989); Adams v.
Law Office of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Bingham v. Collection
Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.D. 1981).
24. See Poirier v. Alco Collections, Inc., 107 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1997); Emanual v.
American Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805 (2nd Cir. 1989); Strange v. Wexler, 796 F. Supp. 1117
(N.D. III. 1992).
25. See Britton v. Weiss, No. 89-CV-143, 1989 WL 148663 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1989)
(concerning collection of a telephone bill)
26. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998).
27. See Juras v. Aman Collection Serv., Inc., 829 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1987).
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FDCPA.28 One other area of debate concerns dishonored checks. Some
courts in the past held that a dishonored check was not a "debt" because it did
not involve an extension of credit.29 However, most courts held they were
"debts" under the FDCPA.30 The more recent cases hold that they are debts
and that the extension of credit is not a prerequisite to the invocation of the
FDCPA. In Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C.,3 the court
held that a dishonored check was covered under the FDCPA where the check
had been written to purchase household goods, irrespective of the extension
of credit.
32
V. STANDARD OF LIABILITY
The FDCPA is a strict liability statute.33 Under its provisions, a single
violation is sufficient to establish liability.34 The statute is remedial and
broadly interpreted to effect the intent of Congress.3" In other words, intent
to violate the act is not necessary. Although almost all courts determine
whether a communication violates the FDCPA by using the "least sophisti-
cated consumer" standard,36 the fact that the debtor is a sophisticated person
is not relevant. For example, in Strange v. Wexler,37 the court applied the
"least sophisticated" consumer standard even though the consumer was an
attorney. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has refused
to adopt either the "unsophisticated" or "least sophisticated" standard.
Although the matter has been twice visited by the Fifth Circuit, it has avoided
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(6)(F)(iii).
29. See Perez v. Slutsky, No. 94-C-6137, 1994 WL 698519, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,
1994).
30. SeeNarwickv. Wexler, 901 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Holmes v. Telecredit Serv.
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Del. 1990); West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Va. 1983).
31. 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997).
32. See id. at 1323. See also Snow v. Riddle, 143 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1998); Charles v.
Lundgren & Assocs., P.C., 1 19 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1997); Byes v. Telecheck Recovery Serv.,
Inc., No. CIV-A-94-3182, 1997 WL 736692. at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 1997).
33. See Teng v. Metropolitan Retail Recovery, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61,65 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Conn. 1990); Cavallaro v. Law
Office of Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
34. See Teng, 851 F. Supp. at 65; Woolfolk, 783 F. Supp. at 725; Cavallaro, 933 F. Supp.
at 1148. See also Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232,1238 (5th Cir.
1997).
35. See Hientz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995); Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521
(6th Cir. 1992); Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 1984).
36. Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2nd Cir. 1993); Clomon v.
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2nd Cir. 1993); Moore v. Ingram & Assocs., Inc., 805 F. Supp.
7, 9 (D.S.C. 1992); Rosa v. Gaynor, 784 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Conn. 1989); Jeter v. Credit Bureau,
Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985).
37. See Strange, 796 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
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adopting a particular standard by concluding that the particular communica-
tions at issue would have violated either standard."
VI. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW AND CHAMPERTY AND
MAINTENANCE
Almost every state has some statutory framework to regulate the practice
of law which makes it illegal for lay persons to practice law. As will be
discussed below, a contract made in violation of the law is illegal and may be
held to be void ab initio, in other words, null, void, and unenforceable. Also,
almost every state has adopted some ethical rule, either the ABA Model Rules
on Professional Conduct or the older ABA Code of Professional Conduct,
both of which prohibit a lawyer from assisting a layperson in practicing law.
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(b) prohibits a lawyer from
"assist[ing] a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law."39 In an ethics
opinion, the Mississippi Bar Association determined that it would violate the
rule on assisting the unauthorized practice of law for a law firm to take cases
which had been previously solicited by a non-lawyer "referral" service despite
the fact that the referral service was a separate corporate entity which
provided services to the injured parties." In Arkansas and many other states,
laws against the unauthorized practice of law are criminal in nature.4 Also,
many jurisdictions, Arkansas included, have laws or rules which prohibit a
corporate officer or employee of a creditor or collector from representing that
company unless that person is licensed to practice law. 2 Although some
courts hold that these statutes do not create a private right of action, many
courts recognize that the court has inherent authority to regulate the practice
of law. 3 At least one court allowed a class action as a means to enjoin the
unauthorized practice of law.' It is helpful to bear in mind that when federal
38. See McKenzie v. E.A. Uffi'nan & Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1997); Taylor
v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5(b) (1980).
40. Mississippi Bar Assoc., Formal Op. 209 (1993).
41. See, e.g., ARK. CODEANN. § 16-22-211 (Michie 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-3-55
(1972).
42. See, e.g., Merco Constr. Eng'rs Inc. v. Municipal Ct. for Long Beach Judicial Dist.,
581 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1978); Remole Soil Serv., Inc. v. Benson, 215 N.E.2d 678 (111. App. Ct.
1966).
43. See Smith v. National Cashflow Sys., Inc., 309 Ark. 101, 827 S.W.2d 146 (1992):
Davis v. University of Arkansas Med. Ctr. & Collection Serv., 262 Ark. 587, 559 S.W.2d 159
(1977); Whelchel v. Stennett, 5 So. 2d 418 (Miss. 1942).
44. See J.H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc.. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587 (D.C. 1973).
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courts interpret the FDCPA, they have consistently held that Congress
intended for the FDCPA to be enforced by private attorneys general.45
Another legal principle which bears consideration in this context is the
common law principle of champerty and maintenance. Champerty consists of
''any agreement whereby a person without interest in another's suit undertakes
to carry it on at his own expense, in whole or in part, in consideration of
receiving, in the event of success, a part of the proceeds of the litigation."46
The elements of champerty are defined as: (1) an agreement;47 (2) to defray,
in whole or in part, the expenses of another's suit;4 (3) by the latter person to
divide with the former the fruits of litigation in the event it proves
successful.4 9 It is not essential that an action be pending at the time of the
contract, it is only essential that litigation be contemplated.5" It is essential
that a lawsuit exist for maintenance to apply.
While champerty is the intermeddling of a stranger in litigation of
another for profit, maintenance is the financing of such litigation. The laws
against champerty and maintenance are aimed at preventing speculation in
lawsuits.5' In many states, there are separate criminal provisions prohibiting
champerty and maintenance.52 These statutes generally grant attorneys an
exemption in taking cases on a contingency fee basis.
5 3
In many instances, when looking at the question of champerty, courts
have focused on the fact that the statutes were intended to prevent strangers
from meddling or trafficking in litigation. An instructive case on champerty
and maintenance is the recent decision in Sneed v. Ford Motor Company.
54
In the Sneed case, Ms. Sneed and others had been injured when the Ford truck
in which they were riding rolled over several times. The insurers, United
States Fire Insurance and National Union Fire Insurance Company, paid Ms.
Sneed and others $5,000,000 and secured an agreement with them to'sue Ford
Motor Company.
45. See Knight v. Snap-On Tools Corp.. 3 F.3d 1398. 1405 (10th Cir. 1993). Bentley v.
Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1993); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d
1314, 1318-1320 (2d Cir. 1993): Russey v. Rankin. 837 F. Supp. 1103. 1105 (D.N.M. 1993):
Cirkot v. Diversified Fin. Sys., 839 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D. Conn. 1993).
46. 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (1991).
47. See Clancy v. Kelly, 166 N.W. 583 (Iowa 1918).
48. See Clark v. Harrison, 184 S.E. 620 (Ga. 1936).
49. See Wyman-Gordon Co. v. Lynch Area Fire Protection Dist., 366 N.E.2d 1055 (111.
App. Ct. 1977): Clark v. Harrison, 184 S.E. 620 (Ga. 1936).
50. See Roberts v. Yancey. 21 S.W. 1047 (Ky. Ct. App. 1893).
51. See Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (111. App. Ct. 1978).
52. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (1972).
53. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-1i.
54. No. 97-CA-0922-SCT, 1999 WL 174255, at *1 (Miss. Mar. 31, 1999).
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Ford countered the suit with a claim that the agreement was champertous.
The insurers responded, in part, by claiming that they had a written assign-
ment of the claim." On appeal, Ford contended that not only must the
agreement pass muster under the assignment statute, but it must also avoid
being champertous. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed, stating "Ford
argues that the fact that Mississippi allows assignment of causes of action
does not mean that assignments can never be champertous. Its argument is
that the assignment must not only satisfy the requirements of the assignment
statute, but the assignment must also avoid champerty. We agree."56
The court indicated that the question was who was the real party in
interest. The court made reference to its earlier decision in Fry v. Layton,
where it held that it was champertous for a total stranger to a contract to pay
only nominal consideration for the purpose of suing on the notes in his own
name. The court distinguished Fry with Stephen R. Ward, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.," where an insured and mortgage loss payee
sued the carrier when the carrier failed to pay for a fire loss. The Mississippi
Supreme Court noted that the contract was not champertous because the
parties, i.e. the Wards and Pine Belt Mortgage Company, were not strangers
to the transaction giving rise to the claim.
The Sneedcourt defined the issue of champerty as being encompassed by
the question of whether the person pursuing the cause was a real party in
interest. The test, according to the Sneed court, is whether the "[p]erson ...
[is] ... entitled to the benefits of the action if successful, that is, the one who
is actually and substantially interested in subject matter as distinguishedfrom
one who has only a nominal, formal, or technical interest in or connection
with it."59
The court concluded that the contract between Ms. Sneed and the
insurers was not champterous.
This case is distinguishable from [Fry, supra], where a champertous
stranger brought other borrowers' claims .... Therefore, we conclude that
the Insurers are not strangers to the present litigation, but in fact have real
interests in not bearing the full costs of the Plaintiffs' injuries in circum-
55. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-3 (1972) (providing that the assignee of chose in action
can sue in its own name).
56. Sneed. 1999 WL 174255, at *6.
57. 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
58. 681 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Miss. 1988).




stances where a non-settling tortfeasor potentially shares fault for these
injuries.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court then noted, "[i]f we had determined the
agreement at issue to be champterous, then it would have been a void contract
under the laws of the State of Mississippi.
' 61
Similar to other states, Arkansas has dealt with the issue of the unautho-
rized practice of law statutorily. The Arkansas Code contains a very broad
prohibition against lay persons and non-legal corporations practicing law.62
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-211 provides the following:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any corporation.., to... tender or furnish
legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings of any nature or
in any other way or manner to ... convey the impression that it is
entitled... to furnish legal... service, or counsel ....
(b) It shall also be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association
to solicit itself by or through its officers, agents, or employees, any
claim or demand for the purpose of bringing an action thereon or...
for furnishing legal... services, or counsel ... for the purpose of so
representing any person in the pursuit of any civil remedy.63
In 1997, the Arkansas Legislature passed Act 1301 entitled "An Act to
Define the Unauthorized Practice of Law and to Set Penalties; and for Other
Purposes."' Act 1301 serves as a supplement to the previous prohibitions
listed in Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-22-211, and makes the violation of
the law a Class A misdemeanor.6 5 Under the Act, it is illegal for any person
to "enter[] into any contract with another person to represent that person in...
property damage matters on a contingent fee basis with an attempted
assignment of a portion of the person's cause of action[.]"'  Furthermore, it
is illegal to "enter [] into any contract, except a contract of insurance, with a
third person which purports to grant the exclusive right to select and retain
legal counsel to represent the individual in any legal proceeding[.]
'67
60. Id.
61. Sneed, 1999 WL 174255. at *10 (emphasis added).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-211 (Supp. 1997).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. 1997Ark. Acts 1301 (codifiedasARK.CODEANN. § 16-22-211 I(a)(4)(Supp. 1997)).
65. See 1997 Ark. Acts 1301 (codified as ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-211 I(a)(4) (Supp.
1997)).
66. 1997Ark. Acts 1301 (codifiedasARK.CODEANN. § 16-22-211 I(a)(4)(Supp. 1997)).
(emphasis added).




At least two cases in this state have dealt with the issue of unauthorized
practice of law in the context of debt collection. In Davis v. University of
Arkansas Medical Center and Collection Service, Inc.,68 the medical center
sued Mr. Davis on a $405.80 hospital bill. Davis answered claiming, among
other things, that the medical center was engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. The trial court entered ajudgment against Mr. Davis. On appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, after concluding that the trial court had
prematurely entered a judgment against the defendant. In reaching its
decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court held:
Neither can we agree with appellees' [the medical center] argument that the
alleged affirmative defense of the unauthorized practice of law constitutes
a counterclaim against the state in violation of Art. 5, 10, Ark. Const.
(1874) which clothes the state with immunity from being a defendant in her
own courts .... Appellant, as a litigant, has standing to question CSI's
authority to practice law. 69
The Arkansas Supreme Court confirmed in Smith v. National Cashflow
Systems, Inc.,7" that a debtor has standing to question the relationship of the
collector and creditor in the context of the issue of the unauthorized practice
of law. The court stated "[a]s to Mr. Smith's complaint that CashFlow was
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we note that as a litigant in the
action, Mr. Smith has standing to raise the issue as a defense."'" The
Arkansas Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether CashFlow had
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. "In short, based on the meager
facts in the record, we cannot reach the question of whether CashFlow was
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law." 72 As such, the question in
Arkansas remains undecided; however, the Arkansas Supreme Court
cautioned that the providing or furnishing of services or counsel might well
constitute the unauthorized practice of law."
As stated earlier, in some instances, where unauthorized practice of law
has been raised as a defense, the creditor, collector and their attorneys have
responded by claiming that the prosecutor is the only office cloaked with the
enforcement of criminal laws regarding the unauthorized practice of law. The
68. 262 Ark. 587, 559 S.W.2d 159 (1977).
69. Id. at 590, 559 S.W.2d at 161 (citing McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330. 500 S.W.2d
357 (1973)) (emphasis added). The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
to allow Mr. Davis the opportunity to provide proof on his allegation of unauthorized practice
of law. On remand, the case settled.
70. 309 Ark. 101, 827 S.W.2d 146 (1992).
71. Id. at 104, 827 S.W.2d at 148.
72. Id., 827 S.W.2d at 148.
73. See id., 827 S.W.2d at 148.
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Arkansas Supreme Court has rejected this argument, and in Mays v. Neal 4
held that it had the inherent constitutional authority to rule on issues regarding
the regulation of the practice of law.75 The court stated that the prohibition
against unauthorized practice served to protect the public.76 In Undem v. State
Board ofLaw Examiners, 77the Arkansas Supreme Court enjoined a bank from
employing attorneys to draft or modify testamentary instruments for the
customers of the bank holding that it violated the laws concerning the
unauthorized practice of law." The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
lawyers could only represent the bank itself and not the customers, notwith-
standing the trust relationship between the bank and its customers.79
As such, the statutes and case law of Arkansas make it abundantly clear
that persons or businesses not licensed to practice should not contract to
provide or furnish counsel, pay court costs, or file complaints. Contracts by
non-lawyers concerning such matters can certainly be challenged by debtors
in court and may, if supported by proof, be held to be invalid. However, this
would not invalidate the debt, only the contract by which the collector seeks
to enforce the debt. °
In applying these principles to the FDCPA it bears in mind to remember
that the FDCPA contains a prohibition against debt collectors taking an action
that they legally cannot take.8 An instructive case on the interplay of state
unauthorized practice of law statutes and the the FDCPA is the recent decision
of Poirier v. Alco Collections, Inc. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit followed the Louisiana Court of Appeals, and held that a
collection agency violated the FDCPA's prohibition against taking or
threatening to take any action which is not authorized by law when the
collector sued in its own name based on an alleged assignment from the
creditor.83 The debtor had successfully defended the collections complaint in
the Louisiana Court of Appeals, where the Louisiana court held that the
collection agency had violated Louisiana's law against the unauthorized
practice of law. 4 In reaching its decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
focused heavily on the fact that the assignment was a "sham" transaction
74. 327 Ark. 302, 938 S.W.2d 830 (1997).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. 266 Ark. 683, 587 S.W.2d 563 (1979).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Smith v. National Cashflow Sys., 309 Ark. 101, 827 S.W.2d 146 (1992).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5)(1994).
82. 107 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1997).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).
84. See Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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because no consideration was paid for the assignment and the creditor retained
control over the account and the litigation. In another FDCPA case, a court
held that there was no assignment of the debt where the creditor retained
control over the account.85 Consequently, it may be a violation of the FDCPA
to participate in a scheme in which the collection agency has no real financial
interest in the debt.
Moreover, and what should be of particular concern to creditors, is that
the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the contract for collection was "null
and void." In other words, the collection agency could not legally enforce the
alleged debt. 6 On appeal, the collection agency had attempted to salvage its
case by relying on a Louisiana statute which allowed a collection agency to
sue on debts assigned to it by a creditor.87 The Louisiana Court of Appeals
rejected the argument, holding that there was no valid assignment to begin
with.88
Many other courts have held that contingent assignments and other
arrangements between the creditor and collector are in violation of state laws
on the unauthorized practice of law. In Russey v. Rankin,89 the court held that
a collection agency violated FDCPA, despite having authorization from a
creditor to sue on a debt where its collection contract allowed a contingency
in recovery. In Kolker v. Duke City Collection Agency," the court held the
state unauthorized practice of law statute had been violated where the
collection agency sued to collect debts on contingency and where the
collection agency, not the creditor, hired the attorney. Many other courts have
reached similar holdings.9
85. See Bieber v. Associate Collection Serv.. Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1410 (D. Kan. 1986)
(holding no assignment where hospital retained ownership of accounts).
86. See Poirier, 680 So. 2d at 742-43.
87. See Louisiana Collection Agency Regulation Act (CARA), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3576.19 (West 1997).
88. See Poirier. 680 So. 2d at 745.
89. 911 F. Supp. 1449(D.N.M. 1995).
90. 750 F. Supp 468 (D.N.M. 1990).
91. See Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1944) (holding that collector who took
assignments of claims on a contingency basis and hired his own counsel committed violation
of unauthorized practice of law statutes, and entering a restraining order); State Bar of
Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc.. 154 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. 1967) (holding that collection
agency engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by purporting to act on behalf of creditor
based on contingency basis and further by hiring and controlling legal counsel), Nelson v.
Smith, 154 P.2d 634 (Utah 1944) (holding that a layman cannot circumvent the statutes
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law by taking an assignment and proceeding in his own
name); State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque. Inc., 514 P.2d 40 (N.M. 1973)
(granting an injunction after holding that practice of law included management of litigation.
providing and hiring counsel; therefore collector violated state law by taking an assignment of
claims and filing suit even though it hired counsel); J. H. Marshall & Assoc. v. Burleson, 3 13
A.2d 587 (D.C. 1973) (holding that contingent fee contract which also called for hiring and
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There are various other instances in which a collection agency was cited
for unauthorized practice of law, separate and apart from actually filing
pleadings and appearing in court. One court held that a collector engaged in
unauthorized practice of law when the collector purchased judgments with the
intent to sue on them.92 Other courts have indicated that unauthorized practice
of law may occur when a collection agency offers legal advice93 or collects a
third party's claim for an attorney.94 In other contexts, ajudgment obtained
in violation of the laws on unauthorized practice of law was held to be void.95
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the far reaching consequences of being held in violation of any
of the above statutes, any attorney encountering a collection agency or its
attorney should explore the relationships between the creditor, collector and
attorney involved. Effective use of the FDCPA and its protections can give
the consumer attorney an advantage to use in negotiating a settlement with the
creditor, collector or its attorney. Additionally, those attorneys who are
actively involved in the representation of collection agencies, or who might
themselves have a financial interest in the collection agency, need to be
extremely mindful of the broad interpretation given by the courts on these
issues. In the opinion of these authors, it would be better for the lawyer to
have a direct contract with the creditor, because almost all states permit
lawyers to contract on a contingency fee basis to bring claims.
directing of counsel violated laws against the unauthorized practice of state law): State v. James
Sanford Agency, 69 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1934) (holding that collector violated state laws by
suing on contingent assignment of debt and retaining counsel to assist in such collection). Some
courts have held that judgments obtained via mechanisms which constitute the unauthorized
practice of law are void. See, e.g., Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 216 P. 718 (Colo. 1923);
Remote Soil Serv., Inc. v. Benson, 215 N.E.2d 678 (111. App. Ct. 1966); Colton v. Oshrin, 278
N.Y.S. 146 (1934).
92. See Bottenus v. Blackman, 336 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1972). The court also criticized the
practice as promoting litigation.
93. See Pisarello v. Administrator's Serv. Corp., 464 So. 2d 917 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding collection agency prohibited from giving opinion on when a statute of limitations
would run).
94. See State ex rel. Porter v. Alabama Ass'n of Credit Executives, 338 So. 2d 812 (Ala.
1976).
95. See, e.g., Remole Soil Serv., Inc. v. Benson, 215 N.E.2d 678 (111. 1966); Colton v.
Oshrin, 278 N.Y.S. 146 (1934); Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 216 P. 718 (Colo. 1923).
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